8th Circuit Finally Puts Jesinoski TILA Case to Rest

The Jesinoskis might finally understand that TILA rescission does not work the way Neil Garfield claims. They spent upwards of $750,000 on trial and appeals, and never bothered purchasing a Mortgage Examination so they could go on the attack.  Instead, the case yo-yo’d between trial appellate courts, and the Jesinoskis ended up losing, badly.  Here’s the summary from the most recent opinion at JESINOSKI v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 2018 :

Mortgage loan borrowers Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski received Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) disclosure documents at their loan closing. Pursuant to TILA and its regulations, borrowers may rescind their loan within three days of closing, but the rescission period extends to three years if the lender fails to deliver “the required notice or material disclosures.” 12 C.F.R. 1026.23(a)(3)(i); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f). Admitting that the lender delivered the required notice (the “Notice”) and material disclosures, but arguing that the lender did not provide the required number of copies, the Jesinoskis sought to rescind their loan on a date just shy of the three-year anniversary of loan execution.

The lender denied rescission, asserting the Jesinoskis had signed an acknowledgment indicating receipt of the required disclosures. The Jesinoskis sued more than three years after closing, alleging TILA violations. The district court dismissed the action as untimely, holding that, even if the three-year limitation period applied, borrowers must file suit and not merely provide notice within the three-year time period. On appeal, our court affirmed, recognizing that our circuit had already taken a position on this issue within an existing circuit split. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding the three-year limitation period applied to the provision of notice rather than the filing of suit. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015).

On remand, the district court[1] granted summary judgment, concluding the signed acknowledgment created a rebuttable presumption that the Jesinoskis had received the required number of copies. The court also concluded the Jesinoskis failed to generate a triable question of fact rebutting the presumption. We affirm.

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THE CURRENT BIAS: EVEN IF HOMEOWNER WINS, NO FEE RECOVERY

Dear Neil Garfield:

You recently complained that the Florida 4th DCA in Sabido v Bank of NY Mellon, the court denied recovery of attorney fees to the Sabidos even though they won at trial.

Clearly you don’t understand the American Rule, or you wouldn’t complain. That rule provides that each party is responsible for paying its own attorney fees unless specific authority granted by statute or contract allows assessment of fees against the other party.

The Florida uniform mortgage security instrument does provide the creditor with the right to recover from the borrower all costs of collecting the mortgage debt, including attorney fees. If Sabidos wanted the same right, they should have written it into the security instrument before signing it.

Florida Statute 57.105 provides for sanctions and recovery of attorney fees by a party that raised unsupported claims. You know about that law first hand because the appellate court awarded recovery of fees to the creditors you sued in the Maslanka case because you lodged unsupported (some might say delusional) claims on behalf of Zdzislaw Maslanka.

The Sabido court based its opinion on the following:

“The borrowers’ motion for fees is denied because the Bank of New York Mellon was not a party to the note and mortgage, and because the borrowers successfully argued that the Bank of New York Mellon was not entitled to enforce the instrument containing the attorney fee provision.”

Ooops.  Maybe the Sabidos should have asked the court to sanction Bank of New York Mellon for lodging an unsupportable claim.  In this case, the borrower stuck his hand in the wrong cookie jar.

Bob Hurt
Mortgage Attack

On 2018-02-13 10:39, Livinglies’s Weblog wrote:

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HSBC v BUSET FLA 3rd DCA Remands for Final Judgment of Foreclosure

nuke going off
Sorry, Neil. Bad Idea.

A few months ago, attorney Neil Garfield wrote a glowing endorsement of the Florida 11th Circuit trial opinion in HSBC v Buset sending forth HSBC without day for a variety of reasons, none of them sensible. The Stop-Foreclosure blog echoed Garfield’s sentiment.  In due course the Florida 3rd District Court of Appeals overturned all of the holdings of the Buset opinion, and remanded the case back to trial court for a final judgment of foreclosure, holding the following:

  1. The trial court erred in accepting expert testimony on legal issues;
  2. The note is not merely a secured interest under UCC Article 9, but rather a negotiable instrument under UCC Article 3 and Florida law, in spite of its reference to the mortgage without incorporating it, and the definition of Note Holder does not destroy negotiability of the note;
  3. HSBC, as note holder and “PETE” (Person Entitled To Enforce the note under the UCC) or agent of the PETE, had standing to foreclose, irrespective of the incomplete or broken chain of ownership of the note during its securitization, and does not need to prove ownership or an unbroken chain of ownership of the note, AND the trial court erred by focusing on the irrelevant chain of ownership of the note instead of the relevant PETE;
  4.  Purported violations of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) are irrelevant to the PETE status of the note holder and did not destroy HSBC’s standing to sue for foreclosure because borrowers are not parties to or beneficiaries of the PSA, and therefore borrowers may not raise PSA violations as defenses to foreclosure
  5. Assignment of the mortgage did not destroy HSBC’s standing to foreclose because the mortgage always follows the note and the PETE always has authority over the mortgage.
  6. The servicer’s business records were admissible, and the trial court erred by blocking admission of borrower payment history, default letters, and payoff printout.
  7. HSBC did not have unclean hands justifying dismissal

What does this prove?

Well, to begin with, borrowers facing foreclosure cannot trust attorneys like Bruce Jacobs and Neil Garfield to save them from foreclosure.  They will just make failing arguments, and waste a lot of money while leading their victim into the hungry jaws of foreclosure.

Second, it suggests that borrowers must find out how the creditor, servicer, lender, mortgage broker, loan officer, title company, or appraiser injured them in the loan transaction, and then GO ON THE ATTACK.

Where do we find such a strategy in action?

In foreclosure activities across the land every business day.  The borrower injures the creditor by breaching the loan agreement, so the creditor files a foreclosure lawsuit or takes the case to the trustee, and a foreclosure and sale of the property follow in due course.

Of course, creditors and their allies in the loan transaction make a host of errors in most loans, and if the borrower hires a competent examination firm like Mortgage Fraud Examiners to look for tortious conduct, legal errors, contract breaches, or violations of law, the examination will turn up injuries (typical of 95% of the loans in the past 15 years).  Some of the injuries might justify huge compensatory and punitive damages.

Don’t expect a foreclosure pretense defense attorney to look for causes of action in a loan transaction.  Such attorneys usually bilk their clients and withdraw from the case just in time for foreclosure.

Bob Hurt

Maven at MortgageAttack