Neil Garfield Gets TILA Rescission WRONG, AGAIN!

Quack Attorney Neil Garfield just posted this dreck on his LivingLies blog:

Removing Liens Rendered Void by TILA Rescission 15 USC §1635

by Neil Garfield

Client goes into the office of an attorney and tells him/her that a notice of rescission was sent. The attorney without studying the issue says the rescission never happened. And so it goes.

In my opinion once the time limits have expired on claims arising from TILA (which includes the debt) the county recorder should remove the encumbrance from the chain of title or be ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The attorney might be on the right track but for the wrong reason. There literally is no question about the meaning of the TILA Rescission statute 15 USC §1635 because the highest court in the land said there is no question. And without any question there is no room for interpretation. See Jesinoski. 
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The plain wording of the statute says that once the notice is sent the OLD loan agreement is replaced with a NEW statutory mandatory loan agreement. This is the factor that is missed by most lawyers and judges on trial and appellate courts. The wording of the statute is clear and it is effective by operation of law the moment the notice is dropped in US postal Service mail.
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It’s not a declaration that the deal is completely gone. It is a change in terms required by statute. Banks have ignored it at their peril but so far successfully.
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The courts have strained themselves in their rebellion against this statute because they don’t think so much power should have been vested in each borrower by the legislature. So the judges answer to the problem is to pretend that the legislative branch did not say what it said. SCOTUS thought it was putting an end to that nonsense in Jesinoski but most judges continue to ignore the mandate of both Congress and the Supreme Court.
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 So there we are. In simple terms the average person who has sent a notice of rescission has title to property that by operation of law has no encumbrance thereon.  But the OLD encumbrance from the OLD loan agreement is still in the County records. I think the recording of the notice of rescission is sufficient to bring an action in mandamus against the county recorder’s office to remove the encumbrance from the chain of title, but I can offer no guarantee that a court will order that, even though it is legally and morally correct.
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In order to do that properly I think it would be prudent to first send a demand letter to the county recorder asking that the encumbrance be removed and asking for whatever instructions they would give in accomplishing the removal.

Bob Hurt responds…

Neil:

You might want to re-read the SCOTUS opinion and the final opinion in the Jesinoski case

The district and circuit court judges both ruled AGAINST Jesinoskis. They concluded that NO TILA VIOLATION OCCURRED, and therefore the Jesinoskis had NO RIGHT OF RESCISSION under TILA.  And SCOTUS, in its Jesinoski opinion, made this statement:

This regime grants borrowers an unconditional right to rescind for three days, after which they may rescind only if the lender failed to satisfy the Act’s disclosure requirements.

You should know that to trigger a conditional right of rescission TILA and its supporting Regulation Z require a violation and notice of rescission within the post-consummation 3-year repose period.  In order to obtain money damages for the creditor’s failure timely to tender and remove the lien, the borrower must sue within one year and 20 days after notice, or counterclaim/sue within one year after initiation of a foreclosure.  As stated in the Hoang case, no federal statute of limitations exists for enforcing the rescission, so the courts must go to state law to find a pertinent statute of limitations.

Jesinoskis claimed that they did not recall receiving the requisite notices of right to cancel, and each had signed an acknowledgement of receipt of the requisite notices.  For that reason the courts relied on the signed acknowledgements rather than on the Jesinoskis’ faulty memories, as indicated in the following excerpt from the opinion:

“The language of the acknowledgment as presented to and signed individually by Larry and Cheryle more than suffices to demonstrate clearly each spouse’s receipt of two copies. There is no indication on the acknowledgment that the Jesinoskis were signing jointly on one another’s behalf. As such, we agree with the Sixth Circuit which interpreted identical language and concluded, “[s]uch clarity should be rewarded with a presumption of delivery that cannot be overcome without specific evidence demonstrating that the borrower did not receive the appropriate number of copies of the Notice.””

Thus, no TILA violation occurred in the Jesinoskis’ loan.  And THAT explains why the courts denied their rescission effort.  It also demonstrates that YOU do not comprehend the simple language of TILA (15 USC 1601), Regulation Z (12 CFR 1026), and the SCOTUS Jesinoski opinion.  For example, take note of section 12 CFR 1026.23(d)(4):

(d) Effects of rescission.

(1) When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance charge.

(2) Within 20 calendar days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return any money or property that has been given to anyone in connection with the transaction and shall take any action necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest.

(3) If the creditor has delivered any money or property, the consumer may retain possession until the creditor has met its obligation under paragraph (d)(2) of this section. When the creditor has complied with that paragraph, the consumer shall tender the money or property to the creditor or, where the latter would be impracticable or inequitable, tender its reasonable value. At the consumer’s option, tender of property may be made at the location of the property or at the consumer’s residence. Tender of money must be made at the creditor’s designated place of business. If the creditor does not take possession of the money or property within 20 calendar days after the consumer’s tender, the consumer may keep it without further obligation.

(4) The procedures outlined in paragraphs (d)(2) [and (3) of this section may be modified by court order.

A creditor who knows he did not violate TILA will naturally resist the expensive process of tendering and removing the lien, and of litigating.  So he will simply foreclose (because the borrower thinks he has rescinded and will stop making mortgage payments), or wait for the borrower to sue to force the creditor to tender and remove the lien.  Generally, the borrower must sue or counterclaim in a foreclosure action in order to enforce the rescission, and in section (4) above, that means a court must order the rescission.

Remember that the SCOTUS granted certiorari in the Jesinoski case because the 8th Circuit had ruled that Jesinoskis must have sued within 3 years after consummation in order to enforce the rescission effort. SCOTUS did not deal with the question of whether a TILA violation had occurred or whether and how the courts must settle the differences between borrower and lender in TILA rescission dispute arising because the creditor refused to tender or remove the lien.  The Jesinoski case in the District Court had never gotten to the point of considering whether Jesinoskis had justification for demanding TILA rescission.  The District Court only got to that point AFTER the SCOTUS had rendered its opinion, that the borrowers need not sue for damages within the repose period of 3 years after consummation –  they needed only to send the notice of intent to rescind within the repose period.

And that (as everyone but you seems to know) means the District Court must settle the matter when the creditor (as in the Jesinoski case) claims no TILA violation occurred and therefore refuses to tender or remove the lien until a District Court judge orders it.  That, after all, is why the Jesinoskis sued to enforce the rescission.

When will you stop misleading borrowers into thinking they can rescind under TILA more than 3 years after consummation, or that they can rescind even though no TILA violation occurred?

Bob Hurt photo
Bob Hurt, Writer

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Mortgage Attack to Beat the Bank

 

Mortgage Fraud Examiners Warns Banks Not Possessing Notes Are Still Entitled To Foreclose If They Meet Certain Conditions That’s Why Attacking The Contract Is The Only Proven Method That Works!

https://communications.carltonfields.com/email_handler.aspx?sid=c49c56d6-3e74-4ef8-a946-265a6353b2d5&redirect=https%3a%2f%2fwww.1dca.org%2fcontent%2fdownload%2f425907%2f4590678%2ffile%2f174265_1284_01102019_09203821_i.pdf

HOMEOWNERS LOSE BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO UNDERSTAND A FORECLOSURE IS A BREACH OF CONTRACT CASE

The typical home mortgage comprises two closely related transactions. The first is a contract between the borrower and the lender under which the lender agrees to pay the borrower money in exchange for a promise to repay that money with interest. This is the note. As a condition for entering into that contract, the lender requires the borrower to give the lender a security interest in their property. This is the mortgage. The borrower is the mortgagor and the lender is the mortgagee.

The lenders’ right under the mortgage is like a non-possessory property interest that the borrower effectively repurchases with each payment on the principal of the loan. While the note gives the lender an “in personam” right against the borrower, the security interest gives the lender an “in rem” right against the property. Hence, destruction of the property — say by a hurricane or fire — might destroy the value of the lender’s in rem right, but will not destroy its in personam right to collect the full value of the loan from the borrower even though the property no longer exists.

Now, if the homeowners want a chance to save their homes, it’s necessary and imperative to have the mortgage transaction analyzed. Because the FDIC found that 83% of the mortgage transactions have problems, and 76% of the appraisals as well.

There’s only one firm in the country that provides that mortgage transaction analysis service–Mortgage Fraud Examiners www.mortgagefraudexaminers.com

MORTGAGE FRAUD EXAMINERS WARNS: THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR COLLECTION OF AMOUNTS MORE THAN FIVE YEARS PAST DUE

In an opinion issued today, Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal joined other Florida appellate courts in holding that the five-year statute of limitations to bring an action to enforce a promissory note and/or mortgage does not prohibit a lender from collecting amounts more than five years past due.

In Grant v. Citizens Bank, N.A., slip op., Case No. 5D17-726 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 26, 2018), the Fifth District, sitting en banc, examined whether the trial judge erred in awarding to a foreclosing lender interest that had accrued more than five years prior to acceleration and the filing of the foreclosure complaint. The court noted that while Florida has a five-year statute of limitations to foreclose, the impact of the statute of limitations is simply that acceleration and foreclosure must be based on a default that occurred within the five year period prior to filing the foreclosure action. Each missed monthly installment payment constitutes a new default on which foreclosure may be based. Furthermore, forbearance from accelerating the note upon a borrower’s default does not constitute waiver of the lender’s right to subsequently seek all sums due and owing. Therefore, even if the lender does not file an action on a note or mortgage until more than five years after the borrower’s initial default, the lender may still recover amounts more than five years past due so long as the action commences within five years of maturity or a subsequent missed installment payment.
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth District receded from its previous opinions in Velden v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 234 So. 3d 850 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) and U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Diamond, 228 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), cases in which the court concluded that the statute of limitations prohibited the collection of amounts more than five years past due. With Grant, the Fifth District now joins the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal in holding that a lender is entitled to recover all outstanding payments upon maturity or acceleration, even those that came due more than five years earlier. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Graybush, 253 So. 3d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018); Gonzalez v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, — So. 3d —, 2018 WL 3636467 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 1, 2018).

The First and Second Districts have not directly addressed the interaction between the statute of limitations and the amounts a lender may collect. Given that neither those appellate courts nor the Florida Supreme Court has spoken on the topic, and now that there is no longer interdistrict conflict between the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts on the issue, trial courts in all districts of Florida are bound by the Grant, Graybush, and Gonzalez opinions. Thus, lenders throughout the state of Florida are able to recover all amounts owed to them—not just those that accrued within the previous five years.

BEWARE OF KNOWN FRAUDSTER & AMATEUR LEGAL THEORIST, EDDIE CRAIG

Eddie Craig, who FALSELY claims to be a “FORMER DEPUTY SHERIFF” (a “former cop” and a “former law enforcement officer”) and an “EXPERT” in the law. Specifically, Eddie Craig FALSELY claims that he was a “DEPUTY SHERIFF” in Nacogdoches County, Texas. Eddie Craig claims that during his “CAREER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT” as a “DEPUTY SHERIFF”, he found out that all traffic law (and all traffic-related law enforcement) was unconstitutional, illegal, invalid, fraudulent and corrupt.
Eddie Craig makes these intentionally fraudulent claims about himself and his background in order to deceptively “TRICK” the American people into thinking that he is a GENUINE AUTHORITY in the law. But, none of this is so.
THE TRUTH:
The closest that Eddie Craig ever came to being a “DEPUTY SHERIFF” was as a “PART-TIME JAILER” for a period of TWO WEEKS in 1992, at which time, he was unceremoniously “FIRED” (“NOT ELIGIBLE FOR RE-HIRE”)!
That’s right. On 8-17-1992, Eddie Craig was HIRED for a “PART-TIME” job as a county “JAILER” in Nacogdoches County, Texas and he was “FIRED” TWO WEEKS LATER on 8-31-1992 (“NOT ELIGIBLE FOR RE-HIRE”)! It is this TWO WEEK TENURE as a “PART-TIME JAILER” in Nacogdoches County, Texas that Eddie Craig refers to as his “CAREER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT” as a “DEPUTY SHERIFF” for which he claims he “left the Air Force”.
See this case. Muniz v. Davis, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4860473033812235072&q=%22Eddie+Craig%22+muniz&hl=en&as_sdt=40006. In this case, the court wrote, “Muniz [a litigant in a traffic-related case who Eddie Craig duped] also asks the Court to consider the [written] expert statement of Eddie Craig, attached as an exhibit to Muniz’s First Amended Complaint… . In the statement, Craig opines that the actions of the law enforcement officers in this case were unlawful [as if Eddie Craig would know]. ALTHOUGH MUNIZ CLAIMS THAT CRAIG IS A FORMER SHERIFF’S DEPUTY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THIS COURT [TO THIS EFFECT OR] OF CRAIG’S PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OR QUALIFICATIONS [AS AN ALLEGED “EXPERT WITNESS]. Simply put, THE COURT HAS NO BASIS TO CREDIT CRAIG’S ASSERTIONS [AS AN ALLEGED “EXPERT” WITNESS]… . ” On this basis, the court CORRECTLY determined that EDDIE WAS NOT AN “EXPERT WITNESS” AND REFUSED TO CONSIDER HIS AMATEUR STATEMENT. (in the 10th paragraph, not including block indented portions, at about 35% through the text). Note that the reason that there was “no evidence before the court” that Eddie Craig was a former Sheriff Deputy is that HE IS WAS NOT A DEPUTY SHERIFF, much less an “EXPERT WITNESS” in matters of the law.
ANALYSIS:
Accordingly, Eddie Craig NEVER obtained any “valuable inside knowledge” of traffic law or traffic law enforcement. Second, Eddie Craig NEVER received any training in traffic law or in traffic law enforcement. Finally, Eddie Craig NEVER even once sat behind the wheel of a law enforcement vehicle, much less made a single traffic stop. (So much for Eddie Craig’s “EXPERIENCE” in his “CAREER” as a “LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER” and “DEPUTY SHERIFF”.).
OTHER FACTS ABOUT EDDIE CRAIG:
REAL law and amateur legal theories ARE NOT the same thing. Instead, REAL law and amateur legal theories are the exact OPPOSITES of one another. Eddie Craig does not use REAL law in court. Instead, he only uses amateur legal theories in court (the same amateur legal theories that he peddles in his videos, seminars and on the radio). For this reason, Eddie Craig has LOST EVERY SINGLE ONE OF HIS OWN CASES, including HIS OWN MISDEMEANOR SPEEDING CASE. State of Texas v. Eddie (Eugene) Craig, Case no. C-1-CR-12-100045, offense date 12-12-2011, ARREST date 06-25-2012, CONVICTION date 06-28-2013, Travis County, Texas. What’s more, Eddie Craig has done no better in his civil cases. He has been sued for failing or refusing to pay his debts on FOUR separate occasions. HE LOST ALL FOUR TIMES. Some “expert”.
Taylor v. Hale, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9860090939829240302&q=%22taylor+v.+hale%22+%22appears+to+contend%22&hl=en&as_sdt=40006 In this case, an amateur legal theorist appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against the judge who presided over his conviction for driving without a driver’s license. The court wrote, “Plaintiff [an amateur legal theorist] appears to contend that HE CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A DRIVER’S LICENSE BECAUSE HE WAS NOT OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE FOR A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY [a false claim identical to what EDDIE CRAIG also falsely claims]. [The Plaintiff claimed]… he was MERELY ‘TRAVELING’… . [He claimed that] THE STATE… CAN [ONLY] REGULATE ‘COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY’ through the requirement of a [driver’s] license BUT NOT ‘TRAVELING’ [a false claim identical to what Eddie Craig also falsely claims]. He contends that the term ‘OPERATE’ MEANS AND REFERS TO SOMEONE ENGAGING IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY in the State [a false claim identical to what EDDIE CRAIG also falsely claims]. The gravamen [core of] of Plaintiff’s argument is that BECAUSE HE WAS ‘TRAVELING’ AND NOT ENGAGED IN A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY, HE DID NOT ‘OPERATE’ A MOTOR VEHICLE and was therefore NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE A DRIVER’S LICENSE [a false claim identical to what EDDIE CRAIG also falsely claims]…. . THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT [read that phrase again]… . That [the] Plaintiff can argue that he was NOT ‘OPERATING’ a motor vehicle BUT MERELY ‘TRAVELING’ strains credulity. Plaintiff was traveling, BUT HE WAS ALSO ‘OPERATING’ A VEHICLE; OTHERWISE, THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE VEHICLE ‘OPERATED’ ITSELF AND TOOK A ROUNDTRIP FROM DALLAS TO LAKE JACKSON WITHOUT ANY ACT PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF. ‘OPERATING,’ as the word is used in [the STATE driver’s license law]… DOES NOT REFER TO COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY [read this phrase again]. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts that the license requirement interferes with his RIGHT TO TRAVEL, such argument is WITHOUT MERIT [read this phrase again]. Requiring one to obtain a license to operate a motor vehicle on a state’s public highway IS NOT an impermissible or undue burden on INTERSTATE TRAVEL… . Ensuring that one can safely operate a motor vehicle and is familiar with the traffic laws IS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF A STATE’S POLICE POWERS and presents NO constitutional impediment to the RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL [read this phrase again]. Translation: Contrary to the claims of Eddie Craig, the STATES are authorized (by the U.S. Constitution and by the Supreme Court) to require drivers of motor vehicles to have driver’s licenses and THAT RULE IS NOT LIMITED TO DRIVERS ENGAGED IN “COMMERCE”. It is the FEDERAL government (NOT THE STATE GOVERNMENTS) whose driver’s license regulations are limited to drivers engaged in “INTERSTATE commerce”. But, Eddie Craig does not know enough to even realize this.
 
Myles v. State, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17234956748209348154&q=%22Myles+v.+State%22+%22was+not+a+hired+driver%22&hl=en&as_sdt=40006 In this case, Myles appealed his conviction for DRIVING WITHOUT A VALID LICENSE. On appeal he argued, “THE STATE OF TEXAS CAN ONLY REQUIRE PEOPLE WHO ARE ENGAGED IN ‘COMMERCE’ WHILE DRIVING ON ITS ROADWAYS TO HAVE A DRIVER’S LICENSE [a false claim identical to what EDDIE CRAIG falsely claims], AND … I WAS NOT A HIRED DRIVER ENGAGED IN COMMERCE [as if that would make any difference]. As Myles explained, ‘I don’t DRIVE. I just TRAVEL from Point A to Point B [an amateur comment of a type Eddie Craig would make].’ Myles never disputed that he was [ALSO] OPERATING A VEHICLE AS HE TRAVELED.” Regardless, the appellate court disagreed with Myles’ theories and affirmed his conviction. Translation: Contrary to the claims of EDDIE CRAIG, the STATES are authorized (by the U.S. Constitution and by the Supreme Court) to require drivers of motor vehicles to have driver’s licenses and THAT RULE IS NOT LIMITED TO DRIVERS ENGAGED IN “COMMERCE”. It is the FEDERAL government (NOT THE STATE GOVERNMENTS) whose driver’s license regulations are limited to drivers engaged in “INTERSTATE commerce”. But, EDDIE CRAIG does not know enough to even realize this.
 
EVERYONE WHO HAS EVER ARGUED FRAUDSTER CRAIG”S ARGUMENTS ARE ALL LOSSES!

Final Jesinoski Opinion Proves Garfield Wrong

Neil Garfield has repeatedly asserted on his blog that all a borrower needs to do is send a rescission notice to the creditor in order to effectuate a rescission, whether or not a TILA violation occurred.  And he has tried to con ignorant borrowers into paying $3000 for his useless “TILA RESCISSION PACKAGE” of related legalistic puffery.

Here’s proof that Garfield’s theory of TILA rescission, and of the SCOTUS Jesinoski opinion, is plain wrong.

In 2018 the Jesinoskis appealed the District Court ruling against them, and the 8th Circuirt Court of Appeals held this:

On remand, the district court[1] granted summary judgment, concluding the signed acknowledgment created a rebuttable presumption that the Jesinoskis had received the required number of copies. The court also concluded the Jesinoskis failed to generate a triable question of fact rebutting the presumption. We affirm.

JESINOSKI v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 883 F. 3d 1010 – Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 2018

You can interpret this to mean that a TILA violation is a condition precedent to TILA rescission. No violation = NO RESCISSION.

Stay-In-My-Home Subsumes Pretender Defender Mark Stopa’s Failed Law Practice

What a Mess Mark Stopa Made

Mark Stopa photo
Mark Stopa Before Disbarment

Look at this mess.  Florida Foreclosure Pretense Defense Attorney Mark Stopa loses his bar license, and a well-intentioned attorney takes over his business.  The below email had an attached letter that includes the Florida Supremes’ order suspending Stopa from the practice of law and says his law firm has been dissolved.

It happened because Stopa cheated Foreclosure Defense clients.

That attorney called me on 21 September 2018 to tell me that he found the Stopa law practice in such a mess that he decided to shut it down for good, and that he hoped Stopa’s foreclosure victim client base would reach out to me for help.
———- Forwarded message ———
From: Help
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2018, 12:55 PM
Subject: Important Time Sensitive Message

Dear Client, Attached is an important letter concerning your case with Stopa Law Firm, P.A. Please review attached letter and stipulation. It is important that you respond.  We thank you for your attention to this matter.

———- END of Forwarded message ———

Why Foreclosure Defense Attorneys Deserve Censure

Now it’s time for a little honesty.  Mark Stopa and thousands of attorneys like him deserve censure and public humiliation because of their horrific record of cheating their desperate foreclosure victim clients out of money and an honest advocacy.  Such attorneys have built their practice on pretending to defend clients against foreclosure, but without doing any research to discover precisely who injured the clients in the loan transaction and how the injuries happened.

If they had done honest research, they would have discovered that upwards of 90% of home loan borrowers have suffered appraisal fraud, mortgage fraud, contract breaches, regulatory violations, legal errors in their documents, servicing abuse, and/or legal malpractice by the attorneys they hired to help save their home.

Why Typical Foreclosure Defense Attorneys Cannot Help Mortgage Borrowers in Trouble

Even the attorney taking over Stopa’s failed practice thought he could help keep foreclosure victims IN their homes.

But, he concluded that he can’t keep the clients in their homes.  He could only do what Stopa did – delay the client’s loss of the home while charging absurd annual and/or monthly fees for the hand-holding until the inevitable foreclosure final judgment and sale of the home occurs.

Why?  Because Stopa and other Foreclosure Pretense Defense attorneys NEVER do the full investigation required to prove that someone injured the borrower in the loan transaction.  And so, they DO NOT KNOW whether and how the borrower got injured.  Therefore, they cannot take legal action against the perps to win compensation for their mortgage victim clients.

SO, they can only DEFEND by seeking a dismissal without prejudice for failure to fulfill conditions precedent to foreclosing, or for lack of standing, or tolling of the statute of limitations.  That means the right creditor will correct his errors and foreclose again, this time winning a final judgment.

What It Takes to Win Compensation

Unless the practitioner PROVES someone involved in the loan transaction or associated activities INJURED the borrower who faces foreclosure for breaching the note, then the vast majority of such borrowers will lose their homes to foreclosure, and the pretender defender attorney will merely delay the process while bilking the foreclosure victim out of monthly payments for the privilege.

In order to discover such injuries, a professional team must analyze the background story of the loan and examine every document in the loan transaction from day one to present time, including litigation documents, servicer correspondence, closing papers, appraisal, loan application, forbearance agreements, loan modification efforts, etc.  Few if any (NONE that I know of) foreclosure pretense defense attorneys have such skill.  Even if some had the skill, they would charge upwards of $15,000 to $20,000 at their hourly rates to do the examination, analysis, and reporting, which take 40 to 60 hours.  What foreclosure victims can afford that?

Why Foreclosure Pretender Defenders Commit Legal Malpractice

The foregoing explains why foreclosure defense attorneys only pretend to defend against foreclosure, and never win actual compensation for their client’s injuries.   And yet, those attorneys hold themselves out as experts in the law.

Think about this.  The creditor accused the borrower of breach of contract by failing to make timely payments.  Doesn’t it make sense that the defending attorney should investigate the circumstances and documents related to the contract in order to find out whether the contract is valid and whether the client suffered injuries in it?

An attorney commits legal malpractice who takes on such a client and fails to perform a comprehensive investigation and go on the attack for the injuries discovered.  And that can justify a legal malpractice action against attorneys like Mark Stopa.  But again, what foreclosure victim can afford such an action?

The Ultimate Solution for Mortgage Victims

The only solution to the above dilemma lies in finding an affordable mortgage examination service.  The borrower should buy that service, and use the information in the examination report as the basis for demanding settlements from the injurious parties, or for filing actions for fraud, breach of contract, and breach of regulatory laws.  In the vast majority of situations, the injurious parties far prefer settling with the borrower than fighting the borrower in a court case that the borrower will surely win.

For more information on the right way to attack the validity of the loan, see http://mortgageattack.com, and fill in the contact form.

Bob Hurt
Consumer Advocate and Mortgage Attack Maven
727 669 5511
Clearwater, FL